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Innovation is, as Joseph Schumpeter once pointed out, above all a combinatory phenomenon. 
Success in accessing knowledge and exploiting it in a way that is beneficial for development 
depends on the ability to combine many different skills and resources, of which many will be 
external to the firm. Arguably, political choices, past as well as present, the quality of 
governance and the business environment, availability of skills, finance and broader social 
and cultural characteristics may all have a say for how well this combinatory dynamics works.  
Based on a review of the literature on how technological, economic and social factors interact 
in the development process this paper sets out to expl re these interrelationships empirically. 
The results, based on data for 75 countries on different levels of development, suggest that 
there is a strong correlation between technological capability, (innovation-friendly) 
governance and social capital, confirming, it is suggested, the important role played by 
politics and deeper social and cultural factors for technological catch-up (or lack of such). 
This contrasts with the role played by for instance op nness to trade, FDI, etc., which - 
according to the results presented here - hardly correlates with anything.  
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The idea that technology plays an important role in development has been around for a long 
time.  Nearly a century ago Torstein Veblen used evi ence from the German industrialization 
process to argue that technological catch up by industrial latecomers was indeed possible, and 
that several other countries such as for example Japan would be likely to exploit this 
opportunity (Veblen 1915). After the Second World War this optimistic scenario was taken 
over by the neoclassical strand in economics, which gradually came to dominate the discipline 
(Solow 1956, 1970). According to this way of thinkig, technology should be seen as a freely 
available “public good”, facilitating development everywhere as long as markets are allowed 
to “do their job”  properly. 
 
However, from the 1960s onwards the view, put forward by among others the economic 
historians Alexander Gerschenkron and Moses Abramovitz (Gerschenkron 1962, Abramovitz 
1979, 1986), that differences in development were mainly caused by technological differences 
and that technological catch-up by late-comers was far from easy, received increasing 
support. This view of technology received further backing from a series of empirical studies 
of industrialization processes in Asia and Latin-America (Kim 1980, Fransman 1982, 
Fransman and King 1984, Dalhlman et al. 1987, Lall 1987).  At the macro level this led to the 
formulation of the so-called “technology gap theory f economic growth” (Fagerberg 1987, 
1988, Verspagen 1991). The focus on technology as the driving force of growth and 
development has been taken up by advocates of the so-called “new growth theory” (Lucas 
1988, Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992).  
 
A commonly held view in this literature is that firms and countries that do not succeed in 
developing appropriate technological activities will continue to lag behind. Concepts such as 
“technological capability” (Kim 1980), “technological mastery” (Dahlman and Westphal 
(1982), “technological capacity” (Bell 1984), “innovative activity” (Fagerberg 1987), 
“innovation capability” (Dahlman et al. 1987), “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levintal 
1990), “innovation system” (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993, Edquist 1997) and “innovative 
capacity” (Furman et al. 2002) have been suggested as interpretative frameworks for analyses 
of this aspect of development. Other writers have chosen to broaden the perspective to include 
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a wider set of social and economic variables. Abramovitz (1986), building on earlier work by 
Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1974), used the term “social capability” as a shorthand for such 
factors, including among other things education, governance and honesty and trust. In a 
similar vein the term “social capital” has been invoked by writers who emphasize the role of  
social and cultural factors for development (Putnam 1993, Woolcock and Narayan 2000).   
 
In this paper we wish to explore further the interrelationships between various technological, 
economic and social factors in development. Based on a review of the existing literature in 
this area, we identify several different dimensions f these capabilities (Section 2). Taking 
advantage of the fact that many new indicators on non-economic aspects of development have 
become available recently, in Section 3 we develop with the help of factor-analysis empirical 
measures of these dimensions and analyse their inter elationships. Section 4 concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of these findings for p licy.  
 
2. Taking stock of the literature 
  
Intuitively, most people would easily accept the idea that technology and economic 
development are intimately related. However, economic theorists have faced great problems 
in incorporating technology into their analysis. Asmentioned above this had to do with a 
particular view on technology that had come to dominate economics; namely as a body of 
information, freely available to all interested, that can be used without being depleted over 
and over again. Arguably, if this is what technology is about, it should be expected to benefit 
everybody all over the globe to the same extent, and c not be invoked to explain differences 
in development.  
 
It is understandable, therefore, that the first systematic attempts to conceptualise the 
relationship between technology and development did not come from the economics 
mainstream. It was the economic historian Alexander G rschenkron who came to set the stage 
for much of the subsequent literature (Gerschenkron 1962).  He argued, based on historical 
analyses of European catch-up with the then leading nation (the UK), that although the 
technological gap between a frontier country and a laggard represents “a great promise” for 
the latter - a potential for high growth through imitating frontier technologies - there are also 
problems that may prevent backward countries from reaping the potential benefits to the full 
extent. His favourite example was the German attemp to catch up with Britain more than a 
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century ago. When Britain industrialized, technology was relatively labour intensive and 
small scale. But in the course of time technology became much more capital and scale 
intensive, so when Germany entered the scene, the conditions for entry had changed 
considerably. Because of this, Gerschenkron argued, Germany had to develop new 
institutional instruments for overcoming these obstacles, above all in the financial sector, 
“instruments for which there was little or no counterpart in an established industrial country” 
(ibid, p. 7). He held these experiences to be valid so for other technologically lagging 




Moses Abramovitz, arguing along similar lines as Gerschenkron, also placed emphasis on the 
potential for catch-up by late-comers which he defined as follows: “This is a potential that 
reflects these countries’ greater opportunity to advance by borrowing and adapting the best 
practice technology and organization of more productive economies” (Abramovitz, 1994a, p. 
87). He suggested that differences in countries’ abilities to exploit this potential might to 
some extent be explained by differences in so-called “social capability”.  What Abramovitz 
had in mind was not only individual skills (acquired through education) but “collective 
capabilities” related to what organizations in the private and public sector are capable of 
doing and how this is supported (or hampered) by broader social and cultural factors (as 
exemplified by the spread of honesty and trust across the population).  
 
Arguably, the approaches of Gerschenkron and Abramovitz were rooted in a specific view of 
modernity that developed as a result of the rise of the US economy to global economic 
leadership during the previous century. This perspectiv , whose most prominent advocate 
came to be the US business-historian Alfred Chandler (1962, 1977), focused on the 
economics of large, integrated companies and the social, economic and organizational 
capabilities needed to support and finance them. Hence, it was assumed that countries seeking 
to catch up with the frontier would have to place emphasis on emulating these capabilities 
(Chandler 1990). Innovation, although acknowledged as important, was, implicitly at least, 
assumed to depend on these capabilities and did not get a whole lot of attention. 
 
The concept “social capability” has become very popular in applied work but there have not 
been many attempts to develop empirical measures reflecting the factors that Abramovitz 
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alluded to. In fact he pointed out himself in later work that the concept remained “vaguely” 
defined (Abramovitz 1994b, p. 24) and expressed pessimi m with respect to the possibilities 
for adequate measurement. In practical applications it has often been assumed to be 
synonymous with educational attainment (Baumol et al. 1989), which is arguably an 




The study of the catch-up of Japan but also a host of o her so-called “newly industrializing 
countries” (NICs) in the 1970s and 1980s led to an increased emphasis on the role of 
technological activities (or capabilities). Although much of this literature focused on the firm 
and industry levels and specific countries (Kim 1980, 1987, Fransman 1982, Fransman and 
King 1984, Dalhlman et al. 1987, Lall 1987, 1992, for an overview see Romijn 1999), other 
studies extended the analysis to include the dynamics of the global economy (Fagerberg 1987, 
1988, Dosi, Pavitt and Soete 1990, see Fagerberg and Godinho 2004 for further details). One 
case which received much attention was the rise of Korea from being one of the poorest 
countries in the world to first world technological powerhouse in just three decades (Amsden 
1989, Kim and Dahlman 1992, Kim 1980, 1997).  
 
Kim (1980) suggested the concept “technological capability”, which he in later work defined 
as “the ability to make effective use of technological knowledge in efforts to assimilate, use, 
adapt and change existing technologies”1 (Kim 1997, p. 4), as a tool for the analysis of the
Korean case. As has become common in the literature (Dalhlman et al. 1987), Kim considered 
three aspects of it: production capability, investment capability and innovation capability. 
Thus, the concept includes not only organized R&D, which arguably is a small activity in 
many developing countries. This broader perspective is, as we shall explain in more detail 
later, essential when discussing the role of innovati n (and innovation policy) in the 
developing part of the world. Kim (1997) and other w iters also emphasized that the 
requirements became more stringent, in particular with respect to innovation capabilities, as 
countries climbed up the development ladder. Hence, for a catching-up country, the 
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National innovation system 
 
The 1990s also saw the birth of a large body of research aimed at exploring the  
interrelationships between firm level exploration and exploitation of knowledge and external 
knowledge providers, many of them public, and the important role of policy and governance 
in shaping this dynamics. The concept “national innovation system”, first used in public by 
Christoper Freeman in an analysis of the Japan (Freeman 1987), became a popular analytical 
tool for researchers who wanted to get a firmer grasp of what determined such interaction 
(Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993 and Edquist 1997). Organizations such as the OECD, the EU 
and the UN intensified their efforts to provide relevant statistics with which performance 
along these lines could be assessed. However, the adoption of the innovation system approach 
to developing countries is a relatively recent phenomenon and arguably still in its infancy 
(Viotti 2002, Muchie et al. 2003, Lundvall et al. 2006).  
 
Moreover, there is currently no agreement in the literature on how innovation systems should 
be defined and studied empirically.2 Edquist (2004, p. 182) argues for example that natio l 
systems of innovation include “all important economic, social, political, organizational, 
institutional, and other factors that influence the d velopment, diffusion, and use of 
innovations”. Trying to put numbers on such broad concepts may be a difficult exercise, as 
Archibugi and Coco (2005) point out. Still there have been some attempts in that direction. 
For instance, Furman et al. (2002) and Furman and Hayes (2004) have suggested to measure a 
country’s innovation system (or its “innovative capacity” as they put it) through the number 
of patents and find that there are large differences in this respect across countries at similar 
levels of income. This, to us, appears to be a too narrow approach. First, patents refer to 
inventions, not innovations, and are used much more intensively in some industries than 
others. Second, the global novelty requirement associated with patents implies that minor 
innovations/adaptations, which arguably make up the bulk of innovative activity world-wide, 
will not be counted since these are simply not patent ble. Thus, for countries below the 
technology frontier, and developing countries in particular, most of their innovative activities 
would get unrecognized by this approach. Arguably, a broader perspective is needed. 
 
New growth theory 
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Neoclassical economists’ interest in the possible role of technology for growth and 
development also increased during the 1980s and 1990s.  An important development was the 
emergence of the so-called “new growth theory” (Romer 1986, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 
1992, 1998) according to which differences in economic development across countries should 
be understood as the outcome of differences in endogenous knowledge accumulation within 
(largely national) borders. Although some newly created technological knowledge may spill 
over from one country to another, there are according to this approach sufficient impediments 
to this process (being legal, such as intellectual property rights (IPRs), or more informal in 
nature) to secure that in most cases the lion’s share of the benefits will accrue to the 
innovator. Hence, following this approach long run economic growth should to a large extent 
be expected to depend on appropriability conditions a d the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights.  The increasing attention to IPRs in both developed and developing countries 
and their mutual relationship (for example the TRIPS agreement, see Granstrand 2004) may 
to some extent reflect this shift of emphasis in economic theorizing. 
  
Social capital  
 
More than four decades ago Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris (1965) concluded, on the 
basis of an in-depth study of a number of indicators n development for a large number of 
countries, that “the purely economic performance of a community is strongly conditioned by 
the social and political setting in which economic activity takes place” (p. 578). Adelman and 
Morris saw economic development as contingent on broader social and political changes 
accompanying the transition from a traditional (rural) ways of life, based on high degree of 
self-sufficiency, to a modern industrialized society characterized by market-relationships and 
new forms of institutions and governance. Although, this important insight largely got lost in 
the years that followed, during the nineties interests in the social (societal) prerequisites for 
economic development and catching-up rebounded.  
 
In an important contribution, aimed at explaining the marked gap in economic development 
between two Italian regions, Robert Putnam (1993) put forward the argument that this gap 
had to do with different capacities for responding to social and economic challenges through 
appropriate forms of collective action. Such differences did according to Putnam reflect 
historically given social norms, networking and civi  engagements, or “social capital” as he 
put it, using an already established sociological term.3 This contributed to a rapidly increasing 
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body of research on the role of social capital in development. Michael Woolcock and Deepa 
Narayan of the World Bank, in a survey, define social apital as “norms and networks that 
enable people to act collectively” (Woolcock and Naray n 2000).  A central theme in the 
policy relevant literature on the subject has thus become what governments can do to support 
the creation of trust and strengthen constructive collaboration across different (social, 
political, religious, ethnic etc.) groups.  
 
The fact that the type of factors taken up by the literature on social capital may matter for 
economic development is widely accepted. For instance, Kenneth Arrow pointed out more 
than three decades ago that “It can plausibly be argued that much of the economic 
backwardness in the world can be explained by lack of mutual confidence” (Arrow 1972, p. 
357). The importance of honesty and trust was, as mentioned previously, also emphasized by 
Abramovitz (1994).  The problem is rather how to measure and influence such factors. One 
possible source of information that has been exploited to throw some light on the issue is the 
“World Value Survey”. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefr used such data to analyze the 
relationship between trust, norms of civic behavior and membership in groups on the one 
hand and economic growth on the other for a sample of 29 (mostly developed) countries 
(Knack and Keefer 1997).  They found trust and civic behavior (but not group membership) to 
be positively related to investment and economic growth.  These results are suggestive but the 
limited country coverage of these data has until recently precluded its extension to the 
developing part of the world.  
 
An alternative way to approach the interrelationship between economic, social and political 
forces in development, based on the pioneering work by Adelman and Morris (1965), has 
been suggested by Jonathan Temple and Paul Johnson (Temple 1998, Temple and Johnson 
1998). It was shown that the variation in a wide set of indicators on different aspects of 
development could be reduced, with the help of factor analysis, to four common factors, one 
of which was deemed especially significant. This factor, an amalgam of structural indicators 
(share of agriculture, urbanization etc.), socio-ecnomic characteristics (role of middle class, 
social mobility, literacy etc.) and the development of mass communication (measured through 
the spread of newspapers and radios in the population), is what Temple and Johnson suggest 
using as a measure of “social capability” which, they argue, embraces “social capital”.4  They 
demonstrate that the resulting measure has considerable explanatory power for growth 
performance. However, it clearly is a mixed bag of different types of variables, of which some 
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have little to do with “social” factors. Arguably, we still lack a satisfactory measure of “social 
capability” and/or “social capital” that covers a broad range of countries. 
 
Structural factors  
 
The emphasis on structural factors that is characteristic for the Adelman-Morris and Temple-
Johnson approach is, of course, not new. The view that development requires extensive 
structural changes, substituting low productivity agriculture and natural resource based 
industry with high productivity manufacturing industries, has been around for a long time 
(Kaldor 1967). According to this view, development should be seen as a transformation 
process through which the industrial composition changes and overall productivity increase 
along the route (Chenery et al. 1986).  Measures of development based on this perspective 
naturally focus on productivity at the level of the sector/industry and the industrial 
composition of GDP.  
 
An example of such a measure is the “competitive industrial performance index” (CIP) used 
by UNIDO (2002) which is a mixture of productivity in manufacturing, export orientation and 
shares of medium- and high-tech activities in manufct ring value added and exports, 
respectively. It follows that export-oriented countries with a high emphasis on manufacturing, 
particularly so-called high and medium technology products, will tend to score high on the 
index. A possible weak point is the dependence on a rel tively arbitrary division of 
commodities into high, medium and low technology (Lall 2000). Such classifications, 
although widely used, tend to mask important differences within individual commodity 
groups. For example, the same group (within ICTs for instance) may include both cheap, 
standardized, mass produced products and top of the range, high-end, customized equipment 
sold at high prices to the most demanding segments of the market. Since trade statistics 
measures turnover or sales (not value added), the ranking of countries by specialization in 
high-tech exports may become highly biased upwards by their involvement in low value 
added, low skill segments of global production networks, such as assembling of electronics 
from imported components (Srholec 2007).   
 
Another type of “structural” indicators focuses on the relationship between a country’s 
production or trade structure and the changing composition of global demand. The argument,  
advanced by among others Thirlwall (1979) and Kaldor (1981), is that it is more conducive to 
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the economic growth of a country if it is specialized in products that are in high demand in 
international markets (and hence have a high income elasticity of demand). A more direct 
measure for the same, suggested by Fagerberg, et al. (2007), would be to weigh the growth of 
world demand with the commodity composition of a country’s exports. However, although it 
is difficult to deny that such differences may have n impact, it is also important to emphasize 
the historically specific character of such relationships. Over the long run the distribution of 
growth rates over products is bound to undergo important changes, and so will the benefits (or 
lack of such) associated with any given pattern of specialization. Thus, what matters most in a 
longer perspective may be the ability to adapt to such changes (Fagerberg and Sollie 1987, 
Fagerberg and Srholec 2004).  
 
Successful catch-up and rapid structural change are no doubt closely related (Fagerberg 
1996). But what is cause and what is effect? Attemps to explain the superior productivity 
growth of catching-up economies compared to other countries as resulting from reallocation 
of resources from low productivity to high productivity industries have at best explained a 
small part of the actual difference (Fagerberg 2000). Hence, it seems more likely that rapid 
structural change and successful catch up are both outcomes of more generic factors of the 
type discussed in the previous section (and which we are also going to discuss in the 
following).  
 
3. Stylized facts on economic, technological and social aspects of 
development 
 
To explore the interrelationships between economic, te hnological and social aspects of 
development we have collected data from various sources for 75 countries, the majority of 
which are low or medium income. Since the time series for many relevant indicators are short, 
we focus on recent evidence. In an attempt to increase coverage across countries and limit 
influence of shocks and measurement errors occurring in specific years most indicators are 
measured as five-year averages over 2000-2004. In spite of this there were some missing data 
that had to be estimated (see appendix for details on definitions, sources and the estimation 
procedure). 
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A common approach in the literature is to use theory t  determine which indicators refer to a 
specific dimension and then combine these indicators ypically using equal weights. An 
alternative way to tackle this issue is, as previously mentioned, to assume that indicators that 
are strongly correlated refer to the same dimension of reality.  Based on this assumption factor 
analysis can be used to identify these “latent” dimensions and hence also the weights needed 
to combine the various indicators. However, since in cross-sectional data sets most aspects of 
development tend to be highly correlated, there is a danger that this approach may not reveal 
much more than just that. Therefore we chose to use a combination of these two approaches. 
First, we consult theory to identify the dimensions and, in each case, the relevant indicators 
and then use factor analysis to weigh them together.5 The advantage of this procedure - in 
contrast to many previous attempts in the literature (see Archibugi and Coco 2005 and 
references therein) -  is that it allows us to testhe extent to which a set of indicators allegedly 
reflecting the same dimension of reality are in fact strongly correlated. In our view this 
increases the confidence in the results.  
 
As shown in the previous section, some analysts of national innovation systems favour a very 
broad approach, including everything that might “influence the development, diffusion, and 
use of innovations” (Edquist 2004, p. 182). However, such a holistic approach should not 
necessarily lead to attempts to develop a single measur  covering almost everything. Rather, 
what we need to do is to identify measureable aspect  of this complex reality and analyse how 
these aspects interrelate. The most basic distinction that we will apply here is between 
technological and social capabilities. Technological capabilities we define, in the spirit of 
Kim (1997), as the ability to search for, create and use knowledge commercially. It thus 
includes not only the ability to create “new to theworld inventions” (Furman, et al. 2002) but 
also minor improvements and adaptations to local conditions (that may not be equally 
glamorous but matter a lot economically). Therefore it covers not only “innovation” 
capabilities but also abilities related to organization, production, and commercialization, e.g., 
what Kim and others had in mind with their emphasis on the “production” and “investment” 
aspects of “technological capability”.  
 
Such capabilities to a large extent reside in firms but extend beyond that to networks of 
various public and private organizations (of the type analysed by Nelson 1993) with which 
firms regularly interact in the exploitation of knowledge. Social capabilities, in contrast, are 
characteristics of the social context that firms, organisations and individuals share. Such 
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broader contextual variables do of course in many cases influence firm’s actions, including 
their ability to develop and profit from technological capabilities, but they also have a certain 
degree of autonomy which is why we prefer to identify and measure them separately.     
  
Figure 1 outlines the indicators taken into account to measure technological capability and 
provides results of the factor analysis. As emphasized by Nelson (2004), because of the 
increasing complexity of modern technologies, advanced research and training becomes a 
prerequisite for the ability not only to develop, but also to understand and assimilate 
technology. The quality of a country’s research base is represented by publications in 
scientific journals, international patent applications (PCT) and R&D expenditure, while 
advanced training is captured by enrolment in doctoral programmes, science and engineering 
(S&E) education and the share of professionals and technicians in employment. However, as 
pointed out above, it is not enough to be aware of t chnological opportunities, these also need 
to be exploited in practice, and that requires competences in production, marketing, etc. 
Adherence to quality standards (ISO) may be a good indicator in this respect. Another 
available indicator arguably reflecting “close to the market” innovative activities, e.g., 
competences of a type that would normally get unrecognized by patents or R&D statistics, is 
the number of registered trademarks.  Arguably, access to state of the art ICT is also very 
important for firms’ ability to exploit knowledge commercially and we therefore include three 
indicators reflecting different aspects of the ICT infrastructure. 
 
As is shown by the results from the factor analysis, reported in the upper left quadrant of  
Figure 1, all indicators taken into account are strongly correlated with the capability measure, 
which accounts for 67% of the total variance of these leven indicators. 6 The figure also plots 
our measure of technological capability against GDP per capita (in PPPs) for the countries in 
our sample. Two observations follow more or less immediately. First the very close 
correlation between the two: about 85% of the variation in GDP per capita is “explained” by 
technological capability, which arguably is a “must” for developing countries that wish to 
catch up with the developed ones.7  The second observation is the skew distribution. At the 
top we find the developed world enlarged by Israel and the successful new entrants from Asia 
(Korea, Taiwan, Singapore), in the middle there are  few former socialist countries in 
Europe, while most of the developing countries (with rather low values on both) cluster at the 
very bottom.  
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Figure 1. GDP per capita and technological capability over 2000-2004 
 
 
The overall picture that emerges from Figure 1 is consistent with the results reported by 
Archibugi and Coco (2004), but reveals a somewhat different pattern than what followed from 
the more narrow (patent-based) approach pursued by Furman, et al. (2002). While their 
calculations point to the US, Switzerland, Japan, Germany and Sweden as technological 
leaders, the front-runners in our case are all small countries (Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, 
Denmark and the Netherlands). This finding is suggestiv . It well might be that the success of 
the latter countries, which are among the richest in the world, has to do with particularly well 
developed abilities in exploiting knowledge, rather than the capability to “invent” in a narrow 
sense. 
 
Although much of the information used above, such as statistics on patents, trademarks, 
standards etc., reflects activities in firms, it would of course have been preferable to be able to 
supplement this with a more direct measure of innovative activity at the firm level. From the 
early 1990s European countries started to carry out s -called Community Innovation Surveys 
(CIS) of innovation activities in firms (see Smith, 2004 and OECD, 2005 for details), and 
more recently other countries, including some developing, have started to collect the same 
type of information (UNU-INTECH, 2004). Another recent survey, the Productivity and 
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Investment Climate Survey (PICS) by the World Bank, also includes information on 
innovation activities in firms in developing countries (see World Bank, 2003 for details). The 
results of these surveys are broadly consistent with the argument made here that innovative 
activity is not confined to a small number of highly developed countries but is important in 
the developing world as well. Unfortunately, the number of countries conducting such surveys 
is still much too low to allow inclusion in the factor analysis presented above. Furthermore, 
the questions posed about innovation in the CIS and PICS are not directly comparable, and 
each of these surveys also suffers from other limitations that make broad cross-country 
comparisons problematic.8 There is no doubt, however, that such surveys provide aluable 
insights about innovation activities in developing countries, and will be an important source 
of information for research in the years to come. 
 
Figures 2-5 illustrate the various “social capabilities” that, according to Abramovitz and 
others, are necessary for the successful technological catch up to occur. The first measures the 
quality of the “education system” of a country by the degree of literacy of the adult 
population, the teacher-pupil ratio in primary education and gross enrolments in secondary 
and tertiary programmes. The second factor of social capabilities, “financial system” reflects 
the degree of development and efficiency of financil institutions in a country. Third, 
“business regulation” refers to the “innovation-friendliness” of governance and bureaucracy. 
It reflects how easy it is to set up (or close) a business, protection of IPRs, if laws and order 
are adhered to and to what extent corruption is a problem. Finally “social capital” – or 
perhaps better “social cohesion” – is a measure of the openness of society to people with 
different characteristics (origin, gender, sexual orientation etc.), the degree of trust among the 
citizens of a nation and the willingness to participate in civic activities (such as signing a 
petition). As pointed out in the previous section, it is generally acknowledged that culturally 
embedded characteristics of this type may matter for development, but a comprehensive 
measure has been lacking. As previously the results of he factor analysis are reproduced in 
the upper (lower) corner of the figures. 
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Space does not allow us to comment extensively on these statistics so we will limit it to a few 
observations. First, all of these “social capabilities” correlate positively with development as 
reflected by GDP per capita.  The correlation is particularly strong with “business regulation”, 
emphasizing the crucial role of “innovation friendly” governance in development (Figure 4). 
Second, for “education system” the relationship with GDP per capita is clearly non-linear 
(Figure 2). For the poorest countries, the regression line has a very low slope (almost 
horizontal), indicating large variations in education for countries at comparable levels of GDP 
per capita.  Hence, although investment in education may well be a necessary condition for 
escaping the low-development trap it is clearly not a sufficient one.9  
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Third, the lowest correlation with GDP per capita is found for the financial system variable 
(Figure 3), and among the deviants one finds some developing countries, especially South 
Africa and Malaysia, with much more sophisticated financial systems than one should expect 
from their overall levels of development (while it is the other way around for some developed 
nations, Norway and Ireland in particular).  It would of course have been preferable to be able 
to include data on finance of start ups, venture capital etc. but unfortunately such data were 
not available for a sufficiently large number of countries.  
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Fourth, the countries with the highest recorded values for “business regulation” and “social 
capital” are not the usual suspects, such as the Unit d States, Japan and perhaps Germany, but 
a group of small, high-income countries from Northen Europe (Figures 4 and 5). This finding 
clearly begs further questions about the role of deeper social and political factors in the long-
run development of these countries. Finally, there is a group of (overwhelmingly Muslim) 
countries in Africa and Asia that score very low on social capital (or cohesion), mainly due to 
widespread negative attitudes towards inclusion of women, homosexuals and immigrants into 
society on equal terms (Figure 5). An interesting question is how persistent these attitudes are 
and to what extent it will prevent these countries from exploiting the development potential 
facing them.  
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For the purpose of comparison we also made an attempt to take into account the view, often 
attributed to the World Bank and Western governments, that what really matters for 
development is adoption of a Western-type political system (or democracy in other words) 
and openness to trade, FDI and licensing (Figures 6 and 7). As for the Political System, the 
index is a measure of the degree of “westernization” of the political institutions of a given 
country, the evidence of a correlation with GDP was found to be modest. In fact most 
countries cluster to the right in the figure (“democratic” system) independent of the level of 
development.  
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Although it is widespread view that openness to trade is important for growth, the evidence 
supporting this conclusion is in fact quite weak (Rodrik and Rodriguez 1999, Rodrik et al. 
2004, Fagerberg and Srholec 2006). Our openness index reflects openness to imports, inward 
FDI and royalty and license payments abroad. We exprimented with different ways to define 
openness, such adjusting for country size, but in no case was it possible to find evidence of a 
significant correlation with GDP per capita. In fact, it appears to be a fairly robust result that 
the degree of openness to international transactions d es not discriminate between countries 
that manage to escape the low development trap and those that continue to be poor. This 
should, of course, not be interpreted in support in “closedness” or anything of the sort.  
Arguably, this is an area in need of further research.  
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Table 1 confirms that most aspects of development td to be correlated, even though the 
degree of correlation differs.  We may tentatively use these differences to make some general 
comments on the role of different factors in development. For instance, the results suggest 
that there is a strong correlation between technological capability, business regulation and 
social capital, confirming, we would suggest, the important role played by deeper social and 
cultural factors for innovation and development. This contrasts with the role played by 
openness, which hardly correlates with anything. Thus the results suggest that the openness 
that matters most for development is openness to people who are different from yourself, e.g.,  
the kind of factors included in our “social capital” measure. Moreover, the results indicate that 
“innovation-friendly” business regulation (or governance) is much more important than, say, 
the type of political system. 
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Technological capability 1.00       65 
Education system 0.75 1.00      75 
Financial system 0.75 0.43 1.00     75 
Business regulation 0.93 0.66 0.80 1.00    75 
Social capital 0.85 0.72 0.58 0.79 1.00   75 
Political system 0.58 0.59 0.38 0.53 0.62 1.00  75 
Openness (orthogonal to size) 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.04 -0.08 1.00 75 
 
  
4. Innovation, development and policy  
  
Is innovation important for development? And if so, h w? The answers to these questions 
depend, we will argue, on what you mean by the term innovation. One popular perception of 
innovation, that you meet in media every day, is that as to do with developing brand new, 
advanced solutions for sophisticated, well-off customers,  through exploitation of the most 
recent advances in knowledge. Such innovation is normally seen as carried out by highly 
educated labour in R&D intensive companies, being lar e or small, with strong ties to leading 
centers of excellence in the scientific world. Henc innovation in the above sense is a typical 
“first class” activity. Those at the “third class”, the developing countries, are only indirectly 
affected.   
 
This stylized story is not without some truth. We know that R&D is very concentrated, and 
that the tendency towards internationalization of production is not followed by a similar 
internationalization of R&D. In fact, most internationalized firms continue to do the lion’s 
share of their R&D at home and to the extent that other locations are considered these are 
normally close to “centers of excellence” and not in he developing part of the world (Narula 
2003), except perhaps for China recently (UNCTAD 2005). Thus spread of production does 
not automatically imply spread of knowledge and theimplicit economic benefits thereof. 
Researchers who have tried to find evidence of such benefits from foreign direct investment 
have had a hard time (and sometimes had to conclude to the contrary, see Görg and 
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Greenaway 2002). So if this is what innovation is about, one might be tempted to conclude 
that it is not of much help for the developing part of he world? 
 
There is, however, another way to look at innovation hat goes significantly beyond the high 
tech phobia just described. In this, broader perspective, innovation – the attempt to try out 
new or improved products, processes or ways to do things – is an aspect of most if not all 
economic activities (Kline and Rosenberg 1986, Bell and Pavitt 1993). Although many of the 
outcomes are less glamorous than celebrated breakthoughs in the high-tech world, there is no 
reason to believe that their cumulative social and economic impact is smaller (Fagerberg, et 
al. 2004). Hence, even in so-called low-tech activities, there may be a lot of innovation going 
on, and the economic effects may be very large (vonTunzelmann and Acha 2004). Arguably, 
in this broader perspective, innovation becomes as important for developing countries as for 
the rich part of the world, an argument which is also strongly supported by evidence from the 
surveys of innovation activities in firms referred to above.   
 
This shift of perspective has some important implications for discussions of policy. 
Innovation policy, especially in technologically and economically not very advanced 
environments, needs to have a broad focus (UNCTAD 2007). The question should not be how 
to attract so-called high tech activities from abroad but how to unleash the creative potential 
of actors (firms, organizations, people) that are al ady there, in a broad range of sectors and 
activities. This naturally leads to a focus on the quality of the environment in which the 
various economic actors operate. A number of question  arise. How knowledgeable is the 
environment? How easy is it for a potential innovatr to mobilize the necessary skills, assets 
and external sources of knowledge that will be requir d when moving from the idea to the 
innovation stage? And how innovation-friendly is the system of governance and the social 
environment more generally?   
An important lesson is that it is necessary to consider the joint impact of all these factors, 
because the (causal) chain is never stronger than is weakest link. Although the nature of the 
data does not allow for proofs of causality, the strong interdependence between technological 
capabilities, innovation-friendly governance and deeper social and cultural factors that we 
have been able to confirm here, goes a long way towards suggesting that such 
interdependencies are indeed crucial for development. This is also an important reason why a 
systemic approach to the development and evaluation of policy is required.  
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Appendix (data & sources) 
 
A brief overview of definitions, sources and time/country coverage of the indicators is given 
in the table below. The main source of data is the World Bank (World Development 
Indicators 2007), which combines various sources of data for a large sample of countries. The 
database has been complemented by data from other organizations such as UNESCO, 
UNCTAD, the UN Comtrade Database, the World Value Srvey and others, and in addition 
surveys and datasets produced by research projects. Na ional sources were only used for 
Singapore and Taiwan if necessary. 
 
Sample size and composition was given by availability of data from the World Value Survey. 
We use the data in the form of five-year averages ov r 2000-2004 to limit influence of shocks 
and measurement errors occurring in specific years, expect the data from the World Value 
Survey that refers to the latest period available. A though the selected indicators have broad 
coverage, in some cases there were missing values that had to be dealt with. A number of the 
advanced countries do not monitor literacy anymore. Following UNDP (2006), we assumed 
that all of these countries maintain 99% literacy. The remaining missing data were estimated 
using the impute procedure in Stata 9.2 (see the Stata 9 Manual for details). We based the 
estimation on data for the other indicators with full coverage in the dataset. The number of 
observations estimated by the procedure is given in the last column of the following table. 
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Indicator & definition Scaling Source Average over period 
Countries 
estimated 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): GDP converted to (constant 2000) international 
USD using purchasing power parity rates (PPP). 
per capita 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2007) 
2000-2004 0 
Scientific articles: Counts of articles published in journals  covered by Science Citation 
Index (SCI) and Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI).   
per capita 
U.S. National Science Foundation (Science 
and Engineering Indicators 2006) 
2000-2003 0 
PCT patent applications: Applications for patens under the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) classified by country of residence  of  the first named applicant. 
per capita WIPO 2000-2004 0 
Research and development (R&D): Intramural expenditure on research and 
experimental development performed on the national territory. % of GDP 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2007), OECD (MSTI Database), UNESCO 
(S&T Statistics), RICYT and national sources 
2000-2004 3 
Doctoral enrolment: Students of all ages (gross) in tertiary programmes which are 
devoted to original research and lead to the award of an advanced research qualification 
(ISCED97 code 6) expressed as a percentage of the tertiary school-age population. 
% gross 
UNESCO (Global Education Digest, 
September 2006 release) 
2000-2004 6 
S&E enrolment: Students of all ages (gross) in science, engineerig, manufacturing and 
construction tertiary programmes expressed as a percentage of the tertiary school-age 
population. 
% gross 
UNESCO (Global Education Digest, 
September 2006 release) 
2000-2004 9 
Professionals: Share of professionals, technicians and associate prof ssionals (ISCO88 
codes 2 and 3) in total employment. 
per 
employee 
ILO LABORSTA Database 2006 2000-2004 8 
Trademarks: Applications of a resident for registration of a trdemark with a national or 
regional trademark office. Trademarks are distinctive signs that identify goods or services as 
those produced or provided by a specific person or enterprise. 
per capita 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2007) 
2000-2004 9 
ISO 9000 certifications: A family of standards approved by the International 
Standards Organization (ISO) that define a quality management and assurance program. 
per capita 
International Organization for Standardization 
(The ISO Surveys of ISO 9000 Certificates) 
2000-2003  
Personal computers: Computers designed to be used by a single individual. per capita World Bank (World Development Indicators 2007) 2000-2004 1 
Internet users: Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network. per capita World Bank (World Development Indicators 2007) 2000-2004 0 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers: Telephone mainlines and users of 
portable telephones with access to the the public swit hed telephone network (PSTN). 
per capita 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2007) 
2000-2004 0 
Literacy:  Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ags 15 and above who can read , 
understand a write a short, simple statement on their ev ryday life. 
% 
UNESCO (Global Education Digest, 
September 2006 release), UNDP (2006) 
2000-2004 0 
Secondary school enrolment: Number of secondary students of all ages (gross) 
expressed as a percentage of the secondary school-age population. 
% gross 
UNESCO (Global Education Digest, 
September 2006 release) 
2000-2004 1 
Tertiary school enrolment: Number of tertiary students of all ages (gross) expr ssed 
as a percentage of the tertiary school-age population. 
% gross 
UNESCO (Global Education Digest, 
September 2006 release) 
2000-2004 0 
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Domestic credit to private sector: Financial resources provided to the private 
sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits and other 
accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. 
% of GDP 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2007) 
2000-2004 0 
Market capitalization of listed companies: The share price times the number of 
shares outstanding (also known as market value) of domestically incorporated companies 
listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. 
% of GDP 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2007) 
2000-2004 3 
Interest rate spread: The interest rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers 
minus the interest rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings 
deposits. 
logs 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2007) 
2000-2004 0 
Bank nonperforming loans: The value of nonperforming loans divided by the total 
value of the loan portfolio (including nonperforming loans before the deduction of specific 
loan-loss provisions). 
% 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2007) 
2000-2004 8 
Time to start a business: The number of calendar days needed to complete the 
procedures to legally operate a business. 
days World Bank (Doing Business Database 2007) 2003-20 4 0 
Time to close a business: The number of calendar days required to complete a 
bankruptcy. 
days World Bank (Doing Business Database 2007) 2003-20 4 0 
Protection of intellectual property: Adherence to protection of intellectual property 
rights. 
index 
(0 to 10) 
Gwartney and Lawson (2005); based on 
World Economic Forum (Global 
Competitiveness Report, various issues) 
2000-2003 7 
Law and order: The degree to which the citizens of a country accept the authority of 
established institutions in making and implementing laws and regulating disputes. 
index 
(0 to 10) 
PRS Group (International Country Risk 
Guide, various issues) 
2000-2004 3 
Corruption: The Corruption Perception Index reflects the perceptions of well-informed 
people with regard to the extent of corruption, defined as the misuse of public power for 
private benefit. 
index 
(0 to 10) 
Transparency International (Corruption 
Perceptions Index, various editions) 
2000-2004 0 
Women’s rights: A combined score on adherence to women’s economic, political and 
social rights. 
index 
(0 to 9) 
Cingranelli and Richards (2004) 2000-2004 0 
Index of democracy and autocracy: In institutionalized autocracies chief 
executives are appointed by the political elite andexercise power with few constraints, while 
in institutionalized democracies executives are elect d and constraints substantial. The rank  
goes from autocracy to democracy in increasing order  ( POLITY2 variable) 
index 
(-10 to 10) Marshall and Jaggers (2003) - Polity IV Dataset 2000-2003 0 
Political constraint: The variable measures the probability that a change i  actor 
preferences may change governmental policy. It is ba ed on the number of independent 
branches of government (with veto power) modified by the extent of alignment across 
branches of government (POLCONIII variable) 
index 
(0 to 1) 
Henisz (2000, 2005) 2000-2004 0 
Executive index of political competitiveness (EIEC): The variable reflects 
competitiveness for posts in executive branches in government.  It reflects the balance of 
index 
(1 to 7) 
Beck, et al. (2001, 2005) 2000-2004 0 
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power between legislature & executive, if the political system is presidential vs. 
parliamentary, whether the military has significant influence, , etc. 
Legislative index of political competitiveness (LIEC): The highest score of the  
index goes to countries elections in which multiple arties compete in elections and the 
largest party receives less than 75% of the vote. Th  lowest score goes to countries with and 
unelected legislature. Voting irregularities, election boycotts etc. are also taken into account. 
index 
(1 to 7) 
Beck, et al. (2001, 2005) 2000-2004 0 
Trust in other people: Answer of the question: “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
% World Value Survey 3 
Tolerance to homosexuality: Average answer on a question whether homosexuality 
can always vs. never (ten point scale) be justified. 
index 
(0 to 100) 
World Value Survey 5 
Civic engagement: Average answer to a question of whether the respondent has signed, 
might sign or would never sign under any circumstances (three point scale) a petition. 
index 
(0 to 100) 
World Value Survey 6 
Equal access to jobs for immigrants: Average answer on question whether the 
respondent agrees or disagrees (three point scale) with the statement that when jobs are 
scarce, employers should give priority to local peopl  over immigrants. 
index 
(0 to 100) 






Equal access to jobs for women: Average answer on question whether the 
respondent agrees or disagrees (three point scale) with the statement that when jobs are 
scarce, men should have more right to a job than women. 
index 
(0 to 100) 
World Value Survey  4 
Imports of consumption goods: Imports of durable, semi-durable and non-durable 
consumption goods not elsewhere specified (BEC, rev. 3 codes 61, 62 and 63). 
% of GDP UN Comtrade Database 2007 
2000-2004 
1 
Imports of final capital goods: Imports of final capital goods including transport 
equipment (BEC, rev. 3 codes 41, 51 and 52).
% of GDP UN Comtrade Database 2007 
2000-2004 
1 
Imports of intermediates thereof: Imports of parts and accessories of capital goods 
including transport equipment (BEC, rev. 3 codes 42 and 53). 
% of GDP UN Comtrade Database 2007 
2000-2004 
1 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inward stock: A received investment that 
involves a long-term relationship and reflects a lasting interest in and control by a resident 
entity in one economy of an enterprise resident in a different economy. 
% of GDP UNCTAD (FDI Database 2006) 2000-2003 0 
Royalty and license payments: Payments between residents and non-residents for 
the authorized use of intangible assets and proprietary rights (such as patents etc.) and for the 
use, through licensing, of produced originals of prototypes (such as films and manuscripts).  
% of GDP 








                                                
1 Kim’s definition of technological capability is quite similar to the notion of “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990), andin later works he actually used the two terms interchangeably. 
2 Some researchers in this area emphasise a need for developing a common methodology, based on the functions 
and activities of the system, to guide empirical work (Liu and White 2001, Johnson and Jacobsson 2003 and 
Edquist 2004), while others advocate the advantage of k eping the approach open and flexible (Lundvall 2003). 
3  For classical texts on the subject see Bourdieu (1985) and Coleman (1990). In sociology the term is often used 
as an attribute of individuals, not as a characteristic of communities, as in the tradition from Putnam (1993). For 
an overview and discussion of different usages  of the term see Portes (1998). 
4 Note that Temple (1998) tends to use the terms “social capability”, “social capital” and “social arrangements” 
interchangeably. 
5 How many factors to retain is an important question when using this technique.  A common assumption is that 
for a factor to be retained, it should explain at least as much of the total variance as an average indicator; e.g.,  
the factor should have “eigenvalue” above one. In the estimates presented here only one factor with an 
eigenvalue above one was identified and therefore retained.  
6 Since some of the indicators, such as R&D expenditure, S&E tertiary enrolment and employment of 
professionals and technicians, are not available for  all countries, we had to limit our analysis of technological 
capabilities to a sample of 65 countries with the best coverage (as compared to 75 countries for the or 
indicators further below). 
7 Ireland is a major outlier, however, since more than 20% of its national income tends to be repatriated to 
investors abroad, in terms of GNI per capita it would not be that far from the regression line. 
8 For example, there are differences in sampling, response rate, reference period and formulation of the questions 
about innovation that limit the possibility for broad cross-country comparisons. Some of the results obtained 
from these add to these concerns. In the CIS-type surveys carried out in developing countries the share of 
manufacturing firms that claim to innovate range from around 50% in South Africa to less than 10% in Thailand. 
In the PICS survey the differences are even larger, from more than 80% in Brazil to less than 20% in Egypt. The 
question that suggests itself is to what extent these differences should be considered as real or just an artefact of 
the data? This is an important and timely issue, but we are currently not aware of research that throws much light 
on this. See, however, the discussion in Srholec (2008).   
9 For rich countries, in contrast, the relationship is almost vertical. Thus, there is a strong tendency towards 
convergence in educational standards as countries get richer, indicating, arguably, that without adequate 
investments in skills countries get nowhere. However, this observed tendency towards convergence may also 
reflect that there are upper bounds to the indicators used in the construction of the index. 
